James Campbell is one of the first authors to review the Papua/New Guinea campaign during World War II. While a laudable effort, the book is lacking in several respects in covering the campaign. On the positive side, this is one of the few books to cover this little known backwater of World War II.
With most resources being sent to a ‘Europe first’ strategy, and the Pacific Theater of Operations (PTO) being run by the US Navy and Marines, the efforts of the US Army is relegated to backwater status. But with General McArthur in command and a mission to pay back the promise to return to the Philippines, the first step from his HQ in Australia to the Philippines is through the steaming jungles of Papua/New Guinea.
The book does a good job of retracing the tortuous steps of the troops sent to endure both the impassible terrain and the Japanese defenders. The tales capture the human element, the immense suffering that occurs during this little known campaign. But several gaps prevent the book from being a definitive source on the subject. The first is a lack of tactical detail; little details are given on the thoughts of the leadership as these men slugged across terrible terrain, dealing with limited supplies and tropical diseases. After a more expeditious coastal route is found, little time is spent on focusing on why this poorly planned expedition was continued. From the Japanese side, very little effort is given to understand the strategic and tactical futility of their position. In essence, the campaign is treated as a microcosm instead of as part of a truly global conflict. Battle details are lacking; most histories draw you into the battle and the struggle of each soldier to survive. Campbell’s approach simply relates the challenges faced by the soldiers and their courage under fire. He focuses on the lack of rapid progress which is seen as cowardice by the senior officers in the rear. Again, no explanation is given to why MacArthur failed to grasp the tactical situation or why he didn’t send out a fact-finding mission (or if he did and had his suspicions confirmed).
In his conclusion, Campbell excoriates MacArthur, claiming that he learned a valuable lesson and never again attacked directly into enemy defenses. But he never fully explained why he chose attrition here or why he decided to press forward the attacks after the garrison was completely isolated; rapid exploitation of enemy weaknesses and bypassing strongpoints were hallmarks of his leadership style, such as his decision for the Inchon Landings in Korea. Lacking resources and needing to grab headlines to help his effort, a slow, frontal grinding attack is not behavior typically exhibited by MacArthur. There also is a lack of maps; those included lack details. While Campbell spends much time on the rugged terrain, none of the maps are topographical. Lastly, Campbell uses few references. While his study of the individuals involved shows an ability to gather research material, the tactics depend almost exclusively on the official US Army history. So while I applaud the effort to bring life to a little known theater in World War II, the book overall needs some drastic changes to be a true historical study.
2 Out of 4 Stars
Reviewed By: Michael Stefanac, Business and Accounting Division